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1. Introduction
Over a period spanning the mid 1990s to the beginning of this
decade, Brazil emerged as a leader among developing nations,
increasingly inﬂuential in geopolitical and economic terms. From
the perspective of developing countries striving to achieve suc-
cess, the points of attraction presented by Brazil’s achievements
during this period are multiple: the productivity of its agriculture
as a global export leader; low dependence on non-renewables;
a sizeable and effective National Development Bank, the stabil-
ity of macroeconomic policy; a high tax to GDP ratio providing
resources for development; and innovative social policies like the
Bolsa Família.
The most outstanding general feature of Brazil’s economic per-
formance over this period centred on the socially inclusive nature
of its growth. Growth rates, averaging 3% p.a. were unspectacular
by comparison to China and India, though sustained in the context
of Brazil’s own long term performance. Yet, in contrast to these
countries, growth supported substantive reductions in poverty and
inequality. Between 1995 and 2011 the Gini coefﬁcient declined
notably from 0.6 to 0.53 (IPEA Data, 2015). The move towards
increasing equality was driven by a rapid expansion of income for
the lower deciles of the distribution which contrasted with much
lowergrowth for thoseat the topend.Dataprovidedby theNational
Household Survey show that those in the bottom decile of the
distribution saw their labour income grow by an annual average
of 7–8% over the 2001–2012 period, double that of those in the
top decile (Ferreira, Julián, & Firpo, 2014). Rarely among emerg-
ing economies, Brazil appeared to have turned the longstanding
aspiration of ‘growth with redistribution’ into hard reality.
The success encountered in relation to inclusive growth was
accompanied by a strong record in countering inﬂation. Having
entered quadruple digit territory in the early 1990s, by the mid-
dle of the decade annual consumer price inﬂation had fallen below
10%. Inﬂation has remained below this level ever since. Brazil’s eco-
nomic success also extended to its external accounts. In the 2000s,
propelled by surging demand for key export commodities, Brazil
began to generate a large trade surplus. By 2011 this had reached
almost US$ 30bn and a series of such surpluses had enabled the
accumulation of signiﬁcant international reserves (US$ 352billion
by2011). The build-upof such reserveswas assisted by a signiﬁcant
surge in the net inﬂow of foreign direct investment throughout the
late 1990s and into the last decade. Such investment was drawn in
by a combination of trade and market liberalisation, the opportu-
nities offered up by a signiﬁcant privatisation programme, and the
magnetic pull of a rapidly expanding domestic market.
Since 2011, however, the picture has rapidly darkened. This has
raised questions as to whether Brazil can hold on to its hard-won
socio-economic achievements, let alone build on them. Between
2011 and 2013 annual GDP growth slipped from 3.9 to 2.7%, with
growthof just0.1%being realised for2014. For2015GDPcontracted
by 3.8%. Worryingly, the slump in growth is being accompanied by
a surge in inﬂation: for 2015 consumer price inﬂation for the year
reached 9.01%, well above the central target of 6.5%. The rise in
inﬂation has forced the authorities to reverse a policy of ﬁscal loos-
ening (initiated in response to the2008–2009globalﬁnancial crisis)
while raising interest rates. The current base rate, at 14.25% in mid
2016, is among the highest for all emerging market economies;
it is clearly a serious obstacle in the path of any resumption in
growth. Supplementing the gloomy economic picture has been a
rise in political uncertainty. Following the launch of awide-ranging
anti-corruption investigation in 2014, President Rousseff was sus-
pended from ofﬁce in May 2016 pending a trial in the Brazilian
Senate. The allegations, unproven at the time of writing, were that
the President manipulated public accounts to disguise the impact
of favoured spending programmes on the budget balance.
The sense that the deteriorating macroeconomic (and indeed
political) outlook may be endangering the social achievements
accumulated during the previous decade and a half is sharpened
when trends in unemployment are considered. In April 2016,
unemployment reached 11.2% having risen for the fourth consecu-
tive month and having attained a level much above the record low
of 4.3% achieved in December 2013. According to data provided by
IPEA, the number of Brazilians below the extreme poverty line rose
between 2012 and 2013 (from 10.08m to 10.45m), the ﬁrst time a
rise has been registered since 2003.
Faced with the contrasting picture described above it should
not surprising to note that any notion of Brazil’s famed ‘growth
with redistribution’ strategy as a reality, let alone a resilient or sus-
tainable reality, is highly contested.1 Brazil’s growth performance
in the past (and not just the recent past) is littered with periods
of sharp upward surges swiftly followed by equally sharp crashes;
this has been eloquently described by commentators as ‘vôo de
galhina’ (literally, ‘ﬂight of the chicken’). Brazil’s leading global role
as an agricultural and minerals exporter, a signiﬁcant strength in
the context of high and rising commodity prices, could be seen as
a source of weakness given the potential for a reversal in global
demand trends. In addition, from the perspective of canonical
1 For an interesting discussion of different interpretations of the Brazilian expe-
rience here see Fishlow (2011) Roett (2010) and Mendes (2015).
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development theory stretching back to Prebisch and Singer (Toye
& Toye, 2003), the country’s agricultural and more general natu-
ral resources strength could even be viewed as an impediment to
industrialisation and structural diversiﬁcation.
The role of state institutions in supporting and directing devel-
opment policy in Brazil has met with success in some areas –
EMBRAER and Petrobrás, for example – but has failed to ensure
adequate transport andenergy infrastructuredevelopment. Brazil’s
successes in reaching low income and vulnerable groups with
transfers and basic services have contributed to the reduction of
extremepoverty and income inequality. Still, public social expendi-
ture remains worryingly focused on pensions for better off groups,
and disparities in the quality of basic services are also a matter
of concern. Corruption scandals (including those currently affect-
ing Petrobrás) have also punctuated Brazil’s impressive record of
steady macroeconomic management. Interestingly, it is hard to
ﬁnd harsher critics of Brazil’s development than those among the
Brazilian research community.
At different times, the development literature has strained to
ﬁnd living ‘models’: Kerala, CostaRica, Japan, SouthKorea, theAsian
‘tigers’ have all, at points in the past, shared the limelight. The
search for a template or blueprint capable of delivering develop-
ment is futile. Our interest is in not in identifying a policy template,
but instead in delivering a deeper understanding of the factors
explaining Brazil’s growth with redistribution as a strategy, and
to assess its sustainability. This is the primary focus of the papers
in this special issue.2
Drawing on the papers contained within this special issue this
introductory paper brieﬂy addresses two main questions: ﬁrst,
what are the main components of a Brazilian development ‘model’
and, second, especially in the light of recent events, are the model
and its achievements sustainable?
2. The emergence of a Brazilian development model and its
key components
There is consensus around the view that current development
policies in Brazil have their origins in the period immediately
following the restoration of democracy in 1985. There is less con-
sensus over whether the break point is provided by the 1988
Constitutionwhich refocusedpublicpolicyon inclusion, or, alterna-
tively, by the Plano Real in 1994/5 which enforced macroeconomic
and ﬁnancial stability.
The restoration of democracy in 1985 and the extension of the
franchise to include the illiteratepopulation, aroundaquarterof the
electorate, set the stage for a far reaching debate on the priorities,
values and institutions in Brazilian society, leading to a newConsti-
tution promulgated in 1988. The driving force behind this renewal
of the social contract was the need to make society more inclusive.
The Constitution acknowledged and extended social rights. During
the next few years, these rights were embedded in a legal and insti-
tutional framework. The economy was undermined by high and
rising inﬂation, stokedbywage indexation. ThePlanoReal designed
and implemented by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, ﬁrst as ﬁnance
minister in 1994, and later, as President in 1995, secured broad
support for the lifting of indexation and measures to facilitate ﬁs-
cal responsibility and macroeconomic stability (Averburg, 2002). It
is important to acknowledge some continuitywith the policies pur-
sued in the 1970s and 1980s, especially regarding industrial policy.
2 The papers in this Special Issue derive from research carried out by the Uni-
versity of Manchester-based, DFID-sponsored International Research Initiative on
Brazil and Africa (IRIBA). The research is intended to establish potentially valuable
policy lessons for countries in Africa stemming from Brazil’s recent development
experience.
But the policy paradigm shift can be traced back to the new social
contract in 1988, and the stabilisation in 1994/5. Perhaps more
appropriately still, it can be identiﬁed with the shift in Brazilian
society and economy that spanned these twodates. This period saw
signiﬁcant reforms in a number of areas, notably in relation to the
health system, trade policy, privatisation and the ﬁscal relationship
between the federal and sub-national governments.
What are the main components of the Brazilian development
model which emerged in the 1990s and then continued into the
new millennium? The papers in the collection suggest that the
keyelementshere comprisemacroeconomic stabilisation, carefully
articulated redistributional social policies, and an adept leveraging
of the opportunities presented by a surge in global commodities
demand.
The achievement of macroeconomic stabilisation provided the
bedrock upon which Brazil’s socially inclusive growth was built.
Stabilisation brought about two important pro-poor elements: a
rapid fall in inﬂation and the eventual creation of the ﬁscal space
needed to launch innovative social policies, notably the famous
Bolsa Familía. In their paper, Afonso, Araújo and Guelber (in this
issue) argue that during the 1990s and early 2000s, despite the
success achieved, the institutional reform processes involved in
creating the basis for stabilisation, from the formulation of the
monetary and ﬁscal instruments, to their implementation and
consolidation, did not result from prior strategic planning. The
institutional reformswere insteadmade in response to a succession
of internal and external crises. As each crisis occurred–for exam-
ple the maxi-devaluation of the currency in 1999 – institutional
changewas advanced in response, culminating in a framework that
has assured relative ﬁscal stabilisation over the past decade.
However, the paper argues that the very absence of internal
(as opposed to international) economic crisis since about 2002 has
acted to retard the process of ﬁscal reform. From the boom in com-
modities demand to the rise in family consumption, accelerated
growth in this period has enabled reasonable ﬁscal outcomes in the
absenceof institutional change. Evenwith theeruptionof theglobal
ﬁnancial crisis at the end of the last decade, the ﬁscal and monetary
reform process did not resume in earnest. This did not mean that
the government failed to set in motion counter-cyclical ﬁscal pol-
icy: current spending, in particular with social security and welfare
beneﬁts, continued to increase, ahead of the economy and tax col-
lection. Fiscal beneﬁts were rapidly multiplied, from tax waivers to
credit subsidies. Fiscal results declined, and the federal government
opted for stratagems to create a primary surplus artiﬁcially rather
than reduce the ﬁscal target.
Another, oft overlooked, component of Brazil’s strategy to
achieve greater macroeconomic stability is that of the national
development bank, the BNDES. In their paper, Torres and Zeidan
(in this issue) argue that the BNDES, since its foundation in the
1950s has undergone something of an evolution in its functions.
Continuing to play its original role as a provider of long term credit
to industry (to overcome capital scarcity and market failure), in
the wake of the 2007–2008 international ﬁnancial crisis the Bank
became an active instrument of countercyclical policy, ramping
up its lending in response to ofﬁcial directives. While this pol-
icy has been the subject of subsequent criticism (not least with
recent allegations of improper allocation of funds3), Torres and
Zeidan make clear that the Bank’s actions assisted Brazil in suc-
cessfully navigating the challenges presented by the crisis. The
3 In August 2015 a CPI (Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry) was launched
into the lending activities of the Bank, with a particular focus on alleged improper
inﬂuence by former President Lula da Silva. O Globo, 11.8.15 http://g1.globo.
com/politica/noticia/2015/08/cpi-do-bndes-aprova-convite-para-ouvir-luciano-
coutinho-na-camara.html.
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authors argue that the BNDES experience may have useful lessons
to teachotherdeveloping andemerging countrieswhether in terms
of countercyclical policy or facilitating vital infrastructural invest-
ment. However, they caution that risks exist stemming from the
possibility of crowding out investment, the potential emergence
of “crony capitalism” and the direct costs to the taxpayer of loan
subsidisation.
The translation of Brazil’s healthy growth performance up to
2012 into socially inclusive growth depended on the emergence
of effective social programs. In their paper, Melo, Barrientos and
Canuto (in this issue) analyse how the required ﬁscal space was
created to ﬁnance these. Between 1995 and 2010, taxation rev-
enue rose by a remarkable 7 percentage points from26.9% to 34% of
GDP. This renderedpossible a combinationof pro-poor government
expenditures and comparative ﬁscal orthodoxy. Arguably, this rise
in the Tax/GDP ratio forms the foundation stone of a Brazilian
‘Development Model’, and the clearest demonstration of a renewal
in its social contract.What factors explain Brazil’s success in raising
tax revenue?
There are two periods in Brazil’s historywhen the Tax/GDP ratio
rose signiﬁcantly. The ﬁrst step rise took place under the military
regime in the period 1966–1967. The second step rise spans the
1995–2008 period examined in this paper. Whilst the ﬁrst sus-
tained rise in the Tax/GDP ratio can be explained by the early
introduction of VAT and the modernisation of tax administration,
Melo, Barrientos and Canuto argue that the recent rise raises sev-
eral intriguing questions. First, there are no signiﬁcant changes in
the tax code able to explain the rapid rise in the tax burden and
we can also rule out improvements in tax administration. Second,
the rise in the Tax/GDP ratio in Brazil has not produced signiﬁcant
changes to the, largely neutral, distributional effects of the tax sys-
temtakenas awhole. The rise in theTax/GDP ratiohasmade little or
no contribution in itself to the reduction in poverty and inequality
in the country, except through enhancing the distributive capacity
of government. Throughout the period, the redistributive capac-
ity of ﬁscal policy has concentrated on the expenditure side. Third,
until recently tax policy had not attracted much public attention.
It was only in the aftermath of the global ﬁnancial crisis, and the
public demonstration which began in June 2013, that public inter-
est on the tax burden has risen, as demonstrated by the emergence
of impostometros (“tax meters”) in many cities.
Theabsenceof signiﬁcant reforms to the taxcodeand taxadmin-
istration indicates that policy models are of limited relevance to
explaining the rise in the Tax/GDP ratio. Instead, the paper argues
that Brazil’s tax revenue outcomes are best studied from a political
and political economy perspective.
Although itmight bepossible to attribute the rise in the Tax/GDP
ratio to a combination of ﬁscal illusion and policy drift, the size of
the change and the repeated attempts at tax reform from incom-
ing administrations appear to rule out this option. The paper tests
an alternative explanation: that the return to democracy enabled
strong preferences for redistribution to be embedded in effective
redistributive policies. This involved, inter alia, a large extension
of the franchise incorporating low income groups, competitive
presidential elections awarding power to ﬁscally responsible pro-
grammatic coalitions of the centre-left, executive power to push
for innovative policies, and federal ascendancy in tax and expendi-
ture policy resulting in large part from ﬁscal stabilisation policies.
Bureaucratic capacity and effective tax administration have also
contributed to sustain the rise in Tax/GDP ratio. The political con-
ditions associated with the renewal of the social contract made
possibleanuncontested rise in theTax/GDPratio, as thenetpolitical
gains from comprehensive tax reform proved to be too small.
Given that the main ﬁscal drivers of social inclusion have been
on the expenditure side rather than on the revenue side, a critical
element of the Brazilian model centres on the evolution of social
assistance policies. This element of the model forms the focus of
the paper by Barrientos, Debowicz and Woolard.
The paper begins by surveying the main social assistance
initiatives. Among them, Brazil’s Bolsa Família, an antipoverty pro-
gramme reaching 14million households, including one third of all
children in the country, has been particularly inﬂuential. It has
served as a model for similar programmes in countries across Asia
and Africa. Less well known, but no less important, a variety of
social pension schemes have pushed pension coverage of people
aged 65 and over to just over 86 percent, among the highest in the
region. However, other components are important too. Previdência
Social Rural provides around 7.5 million transfers annually, largely
old age pensions, to informal workers in rural areas. The Benefício
de Prestac¸ão Continuada provides income transfers to 4.2million
older people and people with disabilities in extreme poverty. The
two social pensions in Brazil reach over 11million people and their
households with a budget over two times greater than that of the
Bolsa Família. In the light of this, Barrientos, Debowicz andWoolard
(in this issue) argue that is important to considerall thecomponents
in the package, and their contribution to inclusive growth.
Very little attention has been paid outside Brazil to the con-
ceptual and normative frameworks supporting the development
of social assistance. This paper argues that they are essential to
understanding existing social assistance institutions in Brazil. The
evolution of social assistance in Brazil has been swift, but far from
linear. The 1988 Constitution is the marker for the rapid expan-
sion of social assistance programmes and policies in the years
that followed. However, the policy instruments the Constitution
supported, Previdência Social Rural and the Benefício de Prestac¸ão
Continuada, were not especially innovative or farsighted. Their
orientation was ﬁrmly rooted in conventional welfare policy, on
a distinction between individuals with or without the ability to
work. They focused on old age poverty and on disability, but failed
to address child poverty. The Bolsa Família developed instead out
of municipal experimentation with Bolsa Escola, rooted in a mix
of guaranteed income proposals, multidimensional perspectives
on poverty, and education interventions. Several income transfer
programmes emerged in 2001, consolidated into Bolsa Família in
2003. In the wake of the 1988 Constitution, three main inclusion
strategies have been pursued: (i) integrating informal workers in
social insurance institutions through a special regime; (ii) provid-
ing income transfers to older and disabled people in poverty; and
(iii) setting up human development income transfer programmes
targetedon thepopulation inextremepoverty. They led to the three
main components of social assistance in place in Brazil today.
The contribution of social assistance to inclusive growth will
be better understood if an assessment of the distribution of out-
comes were possible. Estimating a quantile regression model of
the distribution of Bolsa Família outcomes across municipalities
in Brazil in 2003–2009, the paper contributes new information
on this issue. The analysis focuses on adult labour force partici-
pation and school attendance of children aged 6–15. It ﬁnds that,
across municipalities the Bolsa Família did not exercise signiﬁcant
effects on adult labour force participation rates. The literature to
date focuses on mean effects, also ﬁnds non-signiﬁcant effects, but
suggests that sample restrictions would ﬁnd stronger and negative
effects in urban areas. The results fail to conﬁrm this hypothesis.
Regarding school attendance, quantile point estimates indicate that
Bolsa Família had positive and signiﬁcant effects on municipalities
with lower baseline school attendance. The effects are small but
meaningful in the context of high school enrolment rates.Weighing
up all of this evidence, Barrientos, Debowicz and Woolard ﬁnd that
the distribution of Bolsa Família outcomes acrossmunicipalities has
strongly contributed to inclusive growth.
The expansion of tax revenues and social programs noted above
would not have been possible without healthy and consistent
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growth. Fortunately, at least up until 2012 growth in Brazil was
heavily supported by strong global demand for its key export com-
modities, whether agricultural products or minerals. Two papers
in this special issue (by Mueller & Mueller and Figueiredo) con-
sider the experienceof the agricultural sector, respectively focusing
on the political economy of the agricultural sector’s development
and the increasingly impressive extent to which it generates and
absorbs leading edge technologies. In the ﬁrst of these papers
Mueller & Mueller begin by highlighting the enormous expan-
sion in agricultural output over the past 30 years. This period has
seen Brazil become one of the world’s pre-eminent agricultural
exporters in a range of product areas from soya, to oranges, to beef,
to chicken. The rise in output has not in the main derived from an
increase in land under cultivation: this has remained largely con-
stant since the 1970s. Instead, rising agricultural production has
beendrivenbyasharp increase inproductivity, the rise inwhichhas
outstripped thatofothermajoreconomies suchasChinaand theUS.
One might have expected the surge in productivity, output and
product diversiﬁcation – to have sprung from a carefully designed
setof sectoralpolicies implemented ina structured fashion. Instead,
Mueller & Mueller argue that this is not really the case. The state
– through sector-speciﬁc policy – had very limited control over
what actually took place; broader institutional changes exercised
a more important role. The paper argues that the remarkable
transformation in Brazilian agriculture only really got underway
when sustainable, inclusive institutions created a ﬁscal, mone-
tary and political environment in which the sector could succeed.
With this in place the collective beliefs and expectations of policy-
makers and sectorparticipants altered in a favourablemanner. This,
together with expanded global demand, facilitated investment and
productivity-driving technological upgrading.
To understand the latter processmore deeply Figueiredo (in this
issue) reports on an exploratory study of the role of the knowledge-
related institutions and government policies (institutional infras-
tructures) in contributing to the achievement of world-leading
innovative and competitive performance of Brazil’s soybean and
forestry-based pulp and paper industries. These industries have
beneﬁted from the innovative capabilities of the agricultural
research corporation, EMBRAPA, and innovation-supportive gov-
ernment policies, at different stages of their technological devel-
opment. EMBRAPA’s functioning has been based on application-
oriented research, linked with industry needs, and on an
increasingly vibrant network of partnerships with other research
institutes, universities and companies. As Figueiredo indicates, the
effective articulation of innovation networks – in which the state
is just one of the actors – has proven vital in enabling Brazil to cap-
italise upon rapidly expanding global demand for its products. In
examining Brazil’s agricultural export success it is thus important
to focus on the qualitative upgrading which has taken place, and
not just on the rising share of global markets for key products.
From the discussion so far it should be clear that a number
of distinct elements came together to form the platform upon
which rapid economic and social progress was realised between
the mid-1990s and the start of this decade. Collectively, these
could be said to form the basis of a Brazilian Development Model.
Macroeconomic reforms facilitated the emergence of steadier,
non-inﬂationary growth. This in turn supported the real incomes
of the poor. At the same time, social policy innovations such as
the Bolsa Familía helped to drive progressive poverty alleviation
and the emergence of a less skewed income distribution. Mean-
while, growth was supported by the emergence of a favourable
external environment in which global demand for Brazil’s key
exports, among them agricultural products, surged. All of the
elements came together in the context of stable macroeconomic
policy following the successful stabilisation plan in 1994–1995.
Combined, they allowed Brazil to set a new course. However, they
could not have worked effectively without the forging of a broad
consensus across the political spectrum, encompassing key actors
in business, the labour movement and civil society.
As noted at the beginning of this introduction, though, this
model is now under acute pressure. This is the product of less
favourable global economic circumstances and lingering internal
structural challenges. It is to these issues, and potential ways out
of the current crisis, that the discussion now turns.
3. The sustainability of the model and the need for further
reform
No one would pretend that Brazil’s transition from poverty and
instability to steady and inclusive growth is ﬁnished business; it
is still very much a work in progress. Indeed, opinions within and
outside Brazil remain divided on the sustainability of the ‘model’
(see, for exampleBaer, 2014, Fishlow, 2011). TheBrazilian economy
weathered the 2008 global ﬁnancial crisis without a blip, but the
secondary impact of the global trade shockonemerging economies,
in particular a fall in Chinese demand for commodities exports, led
to a sharp fall off in growth in 2012–2015. Poor performance in
the international PISA tests has rekindled debate on the quality of
education, with implications for Brazil’s capacity to raise labour
productivity in the future. And the demonstrations in June 2013
provided a wake-up call to policy makers regarding the upward
shift in expectations concerning quality of public services among
Brazilians. Substantive challenges remain surrounding the qual-
ity and extent of infrastructure, the prevalence of corruption, the
incomplete nature of ﬁscal adjustment, ingrained deﬁciencies in
the stockofhumancapital and theover-relianceof theexport sector
on a select few commodities.
To some extent, the present difﬁculties encountered by the
Brazilian economy are the product of changing external circum-
stances. In the two decades up to 2012 Brazil generally enjoyed
buoyant international demand for its key export commodities,
especially meat products, iron ore, soya and coffee. As Mueller
& Mueller and Figueiredo make clear, Brazil’s response to these
favourable conditions was far from reactive. In fact, considerable
resources were invested in upgrading technologies and production
processes right across the natural resources and natural resource-
based products sectors. This allowedBrazil to capture risingmarket
share in an expanding global market. As this process unfolded, the
relative share of natural resource-based products in overall exports
rose, rendering Brazil more vulnerable to any commodities price
downswing.
Against this background, it should not be surprising that the
growth has suffered so much as commodity prices have fallen and
global demand for these products stalled. This suggests a limitation
to the Brazilian development model and underlines the need for
stronger future sectoral diversiﬁcation in exports. Notwithstanding
this, it should be recognised that Brazil has built on outstand-
ing natural comparative advantages in agriculture and minerals
extraction, raising productivity levels and adding value to the com-
modities it produces (Perez, Marin, & Navás-Aleman, 2014). This
will ensure that Brazil will remain a world class participant in
global commodities markets, well placed to beneﬁt once prices
begin to ﬁrm. While the steep depreciation of the Real since 2012
has only sharpened Brazil’s competitive edge in commodities, it
should also encourage the sectoral diversiﬁcation of exports that
is so badly needed. However, such a broadening of the export
base will also require the maintenance of macroeconomic stability,
greater investment in skills, more cost effective access to ﬁnance,
and improved infrastructure. These issueshighlight someof thekey
ﬂash points of the current crisis and it is to these that the discussion
now brieﬂy turns.
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Notwithstanding the ﬁscal pressures which are now beginning
to emerge (in part as the result of the global commodities slump),
the paper by Afonso, Araújo and Guelber (in this issue) suggests a
dearth of proposals on the horizon to revise or restructure mon-
etary, tax and ﬁscal institutions. The paper argues that weight of
political and institutional opposition – much of it originating from
sub-national levels of government underpins the current inertia.
One of the unfavourable consequences of the failure to acceler-
ate reform is that investments form an ever-smaller portion of the
budget, while the overwhelming majority of expenditure is com-
mitted, contractually or politically to current expenditures, notably
on pensions and debt servicing. This state of affairs is partly to
blame for the lack of infrastructural investment highlighted by
Amann, Baer, Trebat and Villa Lora elsewhere in this issue. Faced
with the need to restrain rising inﬂation and to reassure interna-
tional investors, the authorities (under more hawkish Ministers of
Finance, Joaquim Levy and Henrique Meirelles) have been com-
pelled to adopt tougher primary surplus targets since 2014. In the
absence of further reform, these will limit still further the scope for
growth promoting public investment, whether in infrastructure or
training and education.
The need to upgrade human capital and skills has long been
recognised as a critical requirement in Brazil, but one where
achievements have fallen well short of aspiration. In particular, an
improvement in the skills base will be vital if Brazil is to achieve
greater diversiﬁcation of its export base and so become less vul-
nerable to the vicissitudes of global commodities markets. The
paper by Barrientos, Debowicz and Woolard (in this issue) sug-
gests that social assistance policies have played a valuable role
in ensuring school greater attendance. However, there is a broad
recognition that more will need to be done. This is especially so in
terms of apprenticeships and tertiary education if competitive sec-
toral diversiﬁcation is to become a reality. Whether progress can
be made here in the light of tighter ﬁscal policy is clearly open to
question.
These twokeyconstraints, skills and infrastructure, of theBrazil-
ian development model have become especially prominent in the
past three years, strongly suggesting again that the current crisis
has internal aswell as external origins. Theﬁrst concerns a repeated
failure to invest adequately in infrastructure.
Amann, Baer, Trebat and Villa Lora suggest that the growth
enhancing effects of infrastructural investment are very power-
ful. Against this background it would therefore seem puzzling that
infrastructural investment has not proved adequate, despite recent
high proﬁle policymeasures (such as the PAC– theGrowthAcceler-
ationProgramme). Theauthors argue that the reasons for thispartly
stem from lack of availability of ﬁnancing, but mainly from regula-
tory uncertainty. The inconsistent application of regulatory policy
towards public utilities allied to the ill-coordinated roles of rival
agencies, have combined to slow the pace of investment. Much-
needed infrastructural investment is also being retarded (andmade
more costly) by the scale of corruptionwhichhasnowbeendemon-
strated to permeate procurement by public sector bodies, notably
the majority state owned oil company, Petrobrás.
The corruption issue, more generally, poses severe obstacles in
the path of accelerated growth. Prado and Carson (in this issue)
chart the scale of the corruption problem in contemporary Brazil
and do not deny its extent and growth-retarding effects. However
in theorising corruption as a collective action problem, they also
suggest that Brazil’s approach to tackling it through a multiplic-
ity of agencies may have signiﬁcant advantages. Certainly, Brazil’s
recent experience indicates an efﬁciency and fearlessness in iden-
tifying corruption and then pursuing perpetrators, no matter how
powerfullypositioned. This canbecontrastedwith the far lesseffec-
tive anti-corruption efforts undertaken by Argentina and Mexico.
The determination and effectiveness demonstrated by public
institutions and civil society in tackling corruption suggests there is
a real chance that its incidencewill be reduced in the years ahead. If
so, thiswouldpave theway for lower transactions costs, amorepre-
dictable investment climate and, by extension, accelerated growth.
4. Conclusions
At a difﬁcult time for Brazil’s economy and society, this collec-
tion of papers considers the achievements of the past two decades
while clearly acknowledging – and analyzing – the challenges
which will have to be overcome if progress is to be resumed. In
tackling these challenges Brazil will be able to draw on strengths
and capabilities built up during the good years, recognizing that
real and lasting change has occurred. Brazil’s world class natural
resources andnatural resource-basedproducts sectorwill continue
to provide the economy with enormous underlying resilience, as
will its increasingly diverse energy mix. At the same time, while
more effort clearly needs to be made, earlier investments in health
and education will raise human capital and productivity, among
successive cohorts entering the labour market. Finally the ‘produc-
tivist’ quality of recent social policies, especially antipoverty policy,
will help underpin the political and social sustainability of Brazil’s
recently acquired success.
Wehaveargued that it is indeedpossible todiscern theexistence
of a Brazilian development model. However, we would be the ﬁrst
to acknowledge that presence of such a model remains a matter of
debate. Furthermore, even accepting it exists, the resilience of the
Brazilian development model is now being tested as never before.
Taken together the papers in this special issue throwpowerful light
on these critical debates and issues surrounding Latin America’s
largest economy.
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